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ABSTRACT. In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on
CO2 emissions using a sample of 170 countries over the period 1992–2009. We propose
the use of a difference-in-differences estimator with matching to address the endogene-
ity of the policy variable, namely Kyoto commitments. Countries are matched according
to observable characteristics to create a suitable counterfactual. We correspondingly esti-
mate a panel data model for the whole sample and the matched sample and compare
the results to those obtained using an instrumental variable approach. The main results
indicate that Kyoto Protocol commitments have a measurable reducing effect on CO2
emissions, indicating that a treaty often deemed a ‘failure’ may in fact be producing some
non-negligible effects for those who signed it.
1. Introduction
Among the six dominant greenhouse gases (GHG) mentioned by the
UNFCCC, carbon dioxide emissions (CO2) are the main contributor to
the bulk of accumulated GHG emissions, representing more than 62 per
cent of total GHG in the 2000s and showing the highest growth rates over
time. In 2009 total global CO2 emissions amounted to 31.3 billion tonnes,
an increase of almost 40 per cent since 1990, the base year of the Kyoto
Protocol. The large regional variation in emission trends resulted in a 53
per cent share for developing countries versus 44 per cent for industrial-
ized countries in 2009 (Olivier et al., 2012). Industrialized countries under
Annex B of the Kyoto protocol are expected to cut emissions by, on aver-
age, 5.2 per cent below their 1990 levels by the year 2012, which would
amount to 22.5 billion tonnes.1 Although these countries had reduced CO2
1 Annex-B countries are industrialized nations that signed the Kyoto Protocol. Their
emission reduction goals are mentioned in Annex-B of the treaty. For a list of all
Annex-B countries, please refer to table A1 in the appendix.
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emissions by about 7 per cent in 2009, a substantial part of the decrease was
due to a drop in economic activity in response to the economic crisis. Surely,
technical progress also could have played a role. Indeed, emissions could
increase toward pre-recession levels as developed countries do recover to
their normal levels of economic activity.
Given the current policy debate and the importance of evaluating the
effectiveness of the already established climate agreements, the main aim
of this paper is to analyze to what extent emission commitments from the
Kyoto Protocol affected CO2 emissions. In other words, how much more
CO2 would the countries have emitted had they never ratified the Kyoto
Protocol? This question is important to evaluate present international cli-
mate negotiations and to encourage future climate negotiations, which
could introduce binding emission reduction commitments for all countries
without jeopardizing the growth of developing countries.
From a theoretical point of view, we base our analysis on a more elab-
orated version of the model proposed by Grossman and Krueger (1991,
1995). The model assumes that economic growth, measured by GDP, brings
an initial phase of rising emissions followed by a subsequent phase of
declining emissions. By adding a policy variable, namely commitments to
the Kyoto Protocol, we introduce a crucial factor to this model.
Although a small amount of related empirical research does exist, there
is, to our knowledge, no previous work that uses our identification strategy
to assess the impact of the Kyoto protocol on CO2 emissions. While Maz-
zanti and Musolesi (2009) as well Iwata and Okada (2010) use panel data
to control for unobserved heterogeneity, they do not consider the problem
of endogeneity of the Kyoto variable. Only Aichele and Felbermayr (2012)
address the endogeneity of the policy variable by using an instrumental
variable estimator, but rely on an arguably weak identification strategy
(see below). The main contribution of the paper is two-fold. First, we use
matching combined with difference-in-differences techniques to properly
identify the Kyoto effect. Secondly, to place our results in the existent liter-
ature we also use instrumental variable techniques for panel data to control
for the endogeneity of the policy variable and propose a number of vari-
ables as instruments for Kyoto commitments. Regarding the first approach,
a difference-in-differences estimator with matching is used to create a suit-
able counterfactual in order to estimate how a country’s emission path
would have developed if it had not ratified the protocol. For a robustness
check, we estimate an instrumental variable panel data model and use three
different variables as external instruments for the Kyoto variable, namely
the number of financed projects from the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and International
Criminal Court (ICC) membership. The CDM, as one of the flexible mech-
anisms of the Kyoto Protocol, is correlated with the emission reduction
commitments of the investing country, but not with its current CO2 emis-
sions. Whereas the ICC variable is used by Aichele and Felbermayr (2012),
we additionally propose the number of CDM projects as an instrument. By
using several instruments, we are able to interpret our estimates as causal
effects and test for the validity of the instruments. The main results indicate
that ratifying the Kyoto Protocol has a significant effect on CO2 emissions.
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Countries that face emission commitments emit on average about 7 per cent
less than those without.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related literature. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and discusses
the estimation results. After that Section 4 applies several robustness checks
and lastly section 5 presents the conclusions of the paper.
2. Literature review
The Kyoto Protocol was prepared by the annual meetings of the UNFCCC
and adopted for use at the 1997 meeting in Kyoto. It finally came into force
in 2005 following Russia’s ratification, which fulfilled the established pre-
requisite that a minimum of 55 countries emitting at least 55 per cent of
global GHG emissions had ratified the treaty. The long delay between the
adoption of the protocol and when it was put into practice was due to
discrepancies over which countries should have binding emission reduc-
tion commitments and what those commitments could potentially cost
(Sunstein, 2007).
Although a lot has been said in the political arena about the reasons
why countries committed themselves – or not – to the Kyoto Protocol,
only two studies have empirically investigated the determinants of the
Kyoto ratification decision. York (2005) and Zahran et al. (2007) analyze
the key determinants that led to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol with
or without commitments. According to both studies, population growth,
education levels, energy consumption and emissions growth are the main
factors affecting the decision to ratify the protocol. We will follow these
studies and use the variables they propose as the main factors to construct
the counterfactual in our empirical application.
Another issue concerning the design of the protocol was how to incorpo-
rate developing countries such as China, which in 1997 did not account for
a large share of global emissions but currently does. In order to integrate
developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol seeks to enhance sustainable
development via the CDM. The CDM makes it possible to fulfil a country’s
GHG emission reduction commitments with Certified Emission Reduc-
tion Units (CERs) from any developing country that is a member of the
UNFCCC.
Among the vast empirical literature that studies the determinants of
CO2 emissions, to our knowledge there are only three studies that have
specifically investigated the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on countries’ CO2
emissions. In the first study, Mazzanti and Musolesi (2009) evaluate the
impact of time-related policy events on carbon emissions in European
countries. They find that the income–emissions relationship is affected
by policy events such as the signing of the UNFCCC in 1992 and the
Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Their findings indicate a decline in CO2 emis-
sions for northern European countries after 1997, which they attribute to
the Kyoto Protocol. The main shortcoming of this study is that it focuses
exclusively on European countries and fails to address the endogeneity
bias of the policy events, including Kyoto. Instead, we will use a larger
sample of countries and propose different ways of addressing the potential
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endogeneity bias of the target variable. The endogeneity bias is related to
the fact that countries may self-select into Kyoto if their past emission levels
were low.
Secondly, Iwata and Okada (2010) analyze the effect of ratifying the
Kyoto Protocol on major GHGs using data collected from 1990 to 2005 to
estimate a dynamic panel data model with fixed effects. When estimating
CO2 emissions as the dependent variable, they find that the Kyoto rati-
fication has a significant CO2-reducing effect of about 11 per cent. This
study has two main weaknesses. First, it does not control for the above-
mentioned self-selection problem. Secondly, it justifies using data only
from 1990–2005 by arguing that after 2005 countries had started to invest in
CDM projects and since then emissions have been reduced abroad rather
than domestically. We argue instead that the CDM projects started in 2003
and the amount of emissions that was reduced abroad is very low. Most
countries ratified the Kyoto Protocol after 2005, which is why we extend
the sample to cover more recent years in our empirical application.
The third study by Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) analyzes the impact of
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on countries’ CO2 emissions between 1997 and
2007. In order to overcome the problem of self-selection into the protocol,
the authors instrument the Kyoto variable with a country’s membership
of the ICC and its spatial lag. The authors restrict the data to a sample of
40 countries. Out of them, only 12 countries do not face obligations from
Kyoto and not all of the countries that face obligations are represented
in the data set. The time frame is divided into pre- and post-ratification,
yielding two four-year averaged time periods. Their findings indicate that
countries with Kyoto commitments emit on average about 8 per cent less
CO2 than countries without.
In this study we believe that the sample composition and the time period
matter; therefore we do not restrict the sample and we use data from more
countries over a more recent time period without averaging. Furthermore,
we propose an alternative estimation method that is also able to address
the self-selection issue, namely a matching differences-in-differences esti-
mator. In order to identify the channel of how the Kyoto commitments lead
to reduced emissions, we specify an alternative model and find that coun-
tries did cut emissions by lowering emission intensity. For a robustness
check we compare the results with those obtained by using an instru-
mental variables approach and employ alternative instruments besides the
above-mentioned ICC.
3. Empirical strategy
3.1. Model specification
The empirical model proposes estimating the effects of the Kyoto Proto-
col on CO2 emissions by including income and population variables as
the main drivers of emissions. We follow the approach of Harbaugh et al.
(2002) to identify the right empirical specification for GDP per capita.2
2 The model is based on the Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis by Krueger
(Grossman and Krueger, 1995).
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The quadratic specification is selected as it yields more robust results than
the cubic specification of GDP per capita.3 Technological change is not
added as an explanatory variable because our policy variable accounts for
technological innovations, which are policy induced. The remaining effect
of technological change is modelled in the error term. Our model takes the
following form:
ln CO2i t = αi + λt + β1Kyotoi t + β2 ln POPi t + β3 ln GDPHi t
+ β4 ln GDPH2i t + εi t , (1)
where ln CO2i t is the natural logarithm of CO2 emissions emitted by
country i in year t measured in tonnes; αi and λt are country- and year-
specific effects that control for unobservable country heterogeneity and
common time-varying effects that could affect emissions. Kyotoi t measures
the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions. It takes a value of one
when country i has ratified the Kyoto Protocol and faces commitments
from the treaty at time t , and a value of zero otherwise. The population
variable, POPi t , is measured by the number of inhabitants. GDPHi t and
GDPHi t denote GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared, respectively.
The squared term accounts for non-linearities of the pollution–income
relationship2. Finally, εi t is the error term that is assumed to be independent
and identically distributed.
Most of the countries with emission commitments ratified the protocol
between 2002 and 2005. It is worth noting that a number of high-income
countries, namely the USA, South Korea and Singapore, did not ratify the
Protocol or, as in the case of Canada, withdrew from its obligations. As a
result, the Kyoto dummy is not too highly correlated (0.34) with the level
of per capita income, which permits the identification of separate effects.
As the Protocol did not come into force until 2005, when sufficient countries
had ratified it, the dummy could be defined as taking a value of one from
2005 onwards for all countries. However, there are several reasons to con-
struct the dummy variable using the year of ratification rather than the year
of implementation. First, implementation of the protocol does not have
immediate consequences and, secondly, politicians, the media and voters
are involved in the ratification process and the relevant domestic policy
measures were established immediately after ratification of the Protocol.
We have already mentioned in the previous section the problem of self-
selection in the Protocol. Countries could self-select into the ratification
process and this would bias the estimates of the Kyoto effect. In particu-
lar, high emission levels during the time of protocol ratification might have
lowered the incentives for countries to ratify and thus they chose to ‘select
out’ of the Protocol. In the case of the USA, political pressure not to ratify
the already signed protocol was high.
We create a counterfactual or control group to overcome the problem of
self-selection. We compare the effect of having Kyoto emission reduction
commitments with not having commitments. The effect of facing emission
3 The cubic term did not yield significant results.
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commitments is the conditional average treatment effect on being treated
(ATT):
ATT = E[Yi (1) − Yi (0)|Kyotoi = 1] (2)
where E is the expectation operator. In this framework, the countries in
the control group have to be as similar as possible to the treated group,
except for the fact that they do not face any commitments. According to
York (2005) and Zahran et al. (2007), the decision to ratify or not is mostly
determined by current GDP, population and emission growth. Thus, we
use those variables and their higher order to estimate propensity scores for
ratifying the Kyoto protocol with reduction commitments. We use a probit
estimator to estimate the propensity score to ratify the Kyoto Protocol with
emission commitments. The model specification is given by
Treati = β1GDPgrowthi + β2Pop growthi + β3CO2 growthi + β4GDP growthi 2
+ β5Pop growthi 2 + β6CO2 growthi 2 + εi , (3)
where Treati takes the value one if a country has ratified the Kyoto Protocol
with commitments at some point in time and zero otherwise. GDP, pop-
ulation and CO2 growth are measured as percentages and εi represents
the error term. We use the nearest neighbour to match countries with
Kyoto commitments to comparable countries without commitments.4 We
match the countries for each year separately in order to keep the multi-t
panel structure of the data and to not have to average pre- and post-Kyoto
periods.
Next we apply a difference-in-differences estimator to the matched
sample using the following specification:
̂ATTDDP SM =
1
NT
∑
i∈T = 1
[
Y Ti2 − Y Ti1 −
∑
i∈C
wi j
(
Y Ci2 − Y Ci1
)]
(4)
where NT is the number of treated countries (T ); wi j are the weights
assigned to country j matched to country i (Khandker et al., 2009). Y Ti2 and
Y Ti1 denote the outcomes that correspond to country i in the treated group
in periods 2 and 1, respectively. Y Ci2 and Y
C
i1 are the corresponding outcomes
when country i is in the control group (C). The efficiency of the ATT esti-
mates can be improved by using the inverse propensity score (1/P S) as a
sampling weight (Hirano et al., 2003).
The validity of the ATT is conditioned by the fulfilment of two assump-
tions. The first assumption, conditional independence, assumes that the
selection into treatment is solely based on observable characteristics. We
are aware that there could be unobserved variables, which could be cor-
related with the decision to ratify Kyoto and different from the ones we
4 The nearest neighbour algorithm applies a weight of one to the counterfactual
observation that has the nearest propensity score to the treated observation, in
our case, Kyoto commitments.
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control for. The second assumption is the common support condition. The
common support region includes all the observations where the balancing
score has a positive density for both treated and untreated countries. There
has to be an overlap between treated and untreated countries in order to
match them (Khandker et al., 2009). We present the results on the density
distribution of the propensity scores and the common support region in
figures A1–A5 in the appendix.
In order to analyze through which channel the Kyoto commitments
have led to declining emissions, we modify the model specification in
equation (1) and use the emission intensity, namely the amount of CO2
emissions per unit of GDP, as the dependent variable:
ln
(
CO2i t
GDPi t
)
=αi + λt + β1 Kyotoi t +β2 ln POPi t +β3 ln GDPHi t + εi t . (5)
In this way we analyze how having Kyoto commitments influences
countries’ emission intensities. Technological change, which is in most
cases policy induced, does not cut emissions directly but does have an
effect on the emission intensity of each unit of GDP. Our model relegates
the factors of economic structure, technology progress and energy mix-
ture to the error term since our focus is on the effect of policies induced
by the Kyoto Protocol. Ang (2005) as well as Yang and Chen (2011) analyze
the direct effect of the economic structure, technology and energy mix on
emissions.
3.2. Data
CO2 emission data are from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Cen-
ter (CDIAC, 2012) and include emissions from solid, liquid and gas fuel
consumption as well as emissions from cement production and gas flaring.
The panel is unbalanced because the data on CO2 emissions for economies
in transition are only available from 1992 onwards. Therefore, we restrict
our data set to 170 countries over the period 1992–2009 in order to have
CO2 emission data for each country and each year.
Figure 1 shows that CO2 emissions have steadily increased over the
whole period and in all countries. High-income countries emit on aver-
age more than 10 times the amount of CO2 over low-income countries. The
lower-middle income countries display a more volatile trend and surpass
high-income countries in 2008, mainly due to the upturn in emissions from
China and India. The data on Kyoto Protocol ratification and CO2 emis-
sion reduction commitments are from the UNFCCC (2010) and the data
on the number of financed CDM projects per country are from the UNEP
Risoe Centre (UNEP, 2012). The data on GDP per capita and population are
taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2011). Summary statistics
and cross-correlations for the variables used in the analysis are presented
in tables A2 and A3 in the appendix.
3.3. Main results and policy recommendations
In the first part of this section we present the results obtained using the
difference-in-differences estimator with matching and in the second part
we discuss how the Kyoto Protocol could have affected emissions.
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Figure 1. Average CO2 emissions of high-, middle- and low-income countries
Notes: The y-axis displays CO2 emissions from fossil fuels in billion metric tons.
Economies in transition are excluded. Countries are grouped according to 2009 GNI
per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low
income, US$995 or less; lower-middle income, US$996–3,945; upper-middle income,
US$3,946–12,195; and high income, US$12,196 or more.
Source: CDIAC (2012).
Table 1 presents the results from the probit regression used to estimate
the propensity scores for ratifying Kyoto with emissions commitments. As
in equation (3), the dependent variable Treat takes a value of one for the
treated units. Out of the three key variables which influence the decision to
ratify Kyoto with commitments, only growth in GDP and CO2 emissions
are statistically significant.
We choose nearest neighbour matching to create the control group by
matching countries with commitments (the treated group) to those without
commitments and with a similar likelihood of being in the treated group.
The quality of the match relies on the balancing property and the test of
the difference in means of the independent variables after the match is
made. We show that the balancing property is met and the difference in
the mean propensity score between the treated and control group is 0.28
points. Table A4 in the appendix shows that there is no significant dif-
ference between the treated group and the control group in terms of the
means of the explanatory variables, namely GDP per capita and population
growth, after matching.
Next we apply a difference-in-differences estimator to calculate the aver-
age treatment effect so that we can control for the unobservable country
heterogeneity and common time effects that may also affect emissions.
Table 2 shows the main results. Column 1 of table 2 presents the results for
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Table 1. Results from estimating the propensity scores for
ratifying Kyoto with commitments
Probit
CO2 growth −16.95∗∗∗
(5.77)
Population growth −10.38
(52.58)
GDP growth −19.38∗∗∗
(6.99)
CO2growth2 −89.52∗∗
(37.96)
Population growth2 −6822.45
(4297.16)
GDP growth2 −44.06
(66.21)
Constant −0.73∗∗
(0.29)
No. of observations 186
Pseudo R2 0.57
Notes: The dependent variable is Treat. Robust standard
errors are in brackets, ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
Table 2. Results using the difference-in-differences estimator, 1992–2009
Dep. var. lnCO2 lnCO2 ln(CO2/GDP)
Sample Whole Matched Matched
Weights − − (1/PS) − (1/PS)
Kyoto dummy −0.19∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Treat dummy 0.4∗∗ 6.45∗∗∗ −8.44∗∗ −3.5∗ 0.92
(0.17) (2.25) (3.41) (1.91) (0.74)
lnPopulation 1.02∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.38) (0.31) (0.32) (0.26)
lnGDPH 1.13∗∗∗ 1.66∗ 1.5∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.85) (0.79) (0.12) (0.1)
lnGDPH2 −0.02 −0.06 −0.06
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant −20.32∗∗∗ −36.02∗∗∗ −18.63∗∗∗ −16.22∗∗∗ −17.49∗∗∗
(1.91) (8.6) (2.87) (2.18) (4.08)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 3,056 468 468 429 429
Overall R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗p < 0.1. PS, propensity score.
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the whole sample as a benchmark. The estimated coefficient for the Kyoto
variable (−0.19) is negative and statistically significant, but its magnitude
is considerably high.
Column 2 presents the same specification estimated using the matched
sample instead of the whole sample. An ATT of −0.1 is obtained, indi-
cating that countries that face emission commitments emit on average
10 per cent less CO2 compared to the control group of countries, which
have similar characteristics in terms of GDP and population growth, but
do not have to cut emissions. It is worth noting that restricting the sam-
ple to the matched countries as a way of controlling for the endogeneity
of our policy variable indicates that the coefficient is −0.10 (column 2),
which points to an upward bias of the coefficient in column 1 (−0.19).
In order to refine our estimate and prove its validity, column 3 of table 2
shows the results obtained by using the inverse of the propensity score
(PS) as sampling weights. This refinement gives a Kyoto coefficient of
−0.07, which is the most conservative estimate and the one we take as most
reliable.
Similar to other studies estimating the Kyoto effect, we also conclude
that ratifying Kyoto has a negative and significant effect on emissions. In
particular, our results show that a country with emission commitments
emits on average 7 per cent less CO2 than a country without reduction com-
mitments. This is a lower effect in comparison with the results obtained by
Aichele and Felbermayr (2012), −8 per cent (estimate from a fixed effects
IV regression) and Iwata and Okada (2010), who find an effect of about −11
per cent for CO2 emissions (estimate from a fixed effects estimator). Maz-
zanti and Musolesi (2009) also find the Kyoto Protocol has a negative effect
on CO2 emissions for the northern EU country group.
Interestingly, figure 2 indicates that the average emissions of these two
country groups mainly diverge from the early 1990s onwards, whereas
before that date outcomes moved in tandem, with almost parallel trends.
Hence, the existence of similar emissions trends for ‘similar’ countries
between the treatment and comparison groups before the policy change
validates the use of matching techniques as the preferred model to estimate
the Kyoto effect.
When turning to columns 4 and 5 in table 2 we find that the estimated
Kyoto effect when using emission intensity as the dependent variable
yields a slightly larger result. Countries with Kyoto commitments show
on average a 9 per cent lower emission intensity per unit of GDP than
their comparison group without commitments. This difference in emis-
sion intensity could be the channel through which the Kyoto commitments
affect countries’ emissions. It could be argued that policies such as the
Kyoto Protocol induce technological change, which in turn affects emission
intensity.
Summarizing, we find that Kyoto countries emit less CO2 than compara-
ble non-Kyoto countries, but the effect is lower than previous studies had
estimated. Yet despite the reduced effect, we have been able to find strong
indications that the Kyoto Protocol has not failed and that until now it has
been the only functioning mechanism to prevent the participating countries
from increasing CO2 emissions.
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Figure 2. Average CO2 emissions of high-income countries only
Note: The y-axis displays CO2 emissions from fossil fuels in billion metric tons.
Source: CDIAC (2012).
The main policy recommendation derived from this study is that pol-
icy makers should actively work towards finding a way of extending the
Kyoto Protocol to a wider range of countries, including the so-called new
industrialized nations, which indeed should be renamed ‘already’ indus-
trialized countries. Unfortunately, as of 5 December 2014, only 21 countries
have ratified the Doha Amendment, which would prolong and renew the
commitments from the Kyoto Protocol. The Amendment will only enter
into force once three-quarters of the (38) parties to the Kyoto Protocol have
deposited their instruments of acceptance.
4. Robustness check
4.1. Pre-Kyoto differences
As a robustness check, we run a placebo experiment to test whether the
emission-reducing effect from Kyoto is really due to the ratification of the
Protocol and not to differences in the initial emission levels between coun-
tries. Table 3 shows the results obtained from estimating the same model
using the whole sample of countries over the pre-ratification period, more
specifically from 1980 to 1994. The Treat dummy takes a value of one for the
countries that ratified with commitments at some point in time and zero
otherwise. As the coefficient for facing future commitments from Kyoto
is statistically significant but positive, we conclude that the Kyoto effect
found above is not due to pre-ratification differences in emissions.
4.2. IV estimates
Another option to control for endogeneity is to instrument the variable
Kyoto with a number of selected instruments. The first proposed
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Table 3. Pre-Kyoto estimations
Dep. var. lnCO2 ln(CO2/GDP)
Sample 80–94 unmatched 80–94 unmatched
Treat dummy 3.34∗∗∗ 4.03∗∗∗
(0.92) (0.18)
lnPopulation 1.41∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.11)
lnGDPH 0.74∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Constant −24.05∗∗∗ −17.82∗∗∗
(2.27) (1.29)
Number of obs. 2,370 2,099
Overall R2 0.99 0.99
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ∗∗∗p <
0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
instrumental variable is the number of CDM projects financed by public or
private entities from the Annex B countries. The CDM, as one of the flexible
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, is correlated with the emission reduc-
tion commitments of the investing country, but not with its current CO2
emissions. This is because the amount of emissions reduced by the CDM is
very small and, even if it did affect a country’s emissions, this effect would
be on future emissions instead of current ones. Even though it is necessary
to ratify the protocol in order to invest in CDM projects, we only exploit the
correlation between the two variables.5 We also use two additional instru-
ments, namely membership of the WTO and, as in Aichele and Felbermayr
(2012), membership of the ICC. The instruments must fulfil two conditions.
They have to be correlated with the instrumented variable and they must
not be correlated with the error term. The first stage of the IV approach is:
Kyotoi t = αi + λt + β1 ln POPi t + β2 ln GDPHi t + β3 ln GDPH2i t
+ β4 CDMi t + β5 WTOi t + β6 ICCi t + υi t , (6)
where Kyotoi t takes a value one when a country i has ratified the Kyoto Pro-
tocol and faces commitments from the treaty at time t , and zero otherwise.
αi and λt are country- and year-specific effects that control for unobserv-
able country heterogeneity and common time-varying effects that could
affect the decision to ratify Kyoto. The instruments are CDMi t , WTOi t and
ICCi t . In particular, CDMi t accounts for the number of CDM projects in
which a country invested in year t . WTOi t takes a value of one if a country
is a member of the WTO in the specific year and zero otherwise. Similarly,
ICCi t indicates whether or not a country is a member of the ICC. Finally,
5 CDM projects clearly did not ‘cause’ participation in Kyoto, but the other way
around. However, for an instrument to be valid, all that is needed is for the two
to be correlated (and for CDM projects to be exogenous to the emissions path).
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Table 4. Results from the instrumental variables estimator, 1992–2009
Sample of countries Whole High-income
Instruments used – CDM CDM, WTO CDM, WTO, ICC CDM, WTO, ICC
Kyoto dummy −0.19∗∗∗ −0.3∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.11∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
lnPopulation 1.02∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
lnGDPH 1.13∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 3.63∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.28) (0.28) (0.3) (0.71)
lnGDPH2 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.15∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Constant −21.35∗∗∗
(3.22)
Over ID (Hansen p-value) 0.02 0.06 0.05
Weak ID (F-stat) 29.14 16.52 67.59 28.83
Number of observations 3,056 3,056 3,056 3,056 833
R2 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.71
Number of countries 170 170 170 170 49
Notes: The dependent variable is lnCO2. Robust standard errors are in brackets, ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p <
0.1. Year dummies are included as regressors.
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υi t is the error term. The second stage of the IV approach is:
ln CO2i t = αi + λt + β1Kyotoi t + β2 ln POPi t + β3 ln GDPHi t
+ β4 ln GDPH2i t + μi t , (7)
where lnCO2i t is the natural log of CO2 emissions emitted by country i in
year t measured in tonnes. The variable Kyotoi t is instrumented with the
variables from equation (6) and a maximum of three instruments. μi t is the
error term.
Column 1 in table 4 presents the benchmark regression without instru-
menting the Kyoto variable. Column 2 presents the instrumental variable
estimation results (−0.3) using the number of CDM projects a country
has invested in as the instrument. The Kyoto effect is negative and the
magnitude of the effect is even greater than in column 1 but inaccurately
estimated. When we add WTO membership as an additional instrument
in column 3, the effect declines slightly to −0.25. Nevertheless, the Hansen
test rejects the validity of our instruments (p-value = 0.02).
Similar to Aichele and Felbermayr (2012), we add ICC membership as a
third instrument. The result hardly changes (−0.26), but the Hansen test
still rejects the validity of the instruments. In order to make the sample
more homogenous, we reduce the sample to high-income countries in
column 5 (table 4). We find that high-income countries with Kyoto
commitments emit on average 11 per cent less CO2 than those without
commitments. This effect is higher than the result obtained by Aichele
and Felbermayr (2012), but they use a smaller sample of 40 countries.
Apparently, the results are sensitive to small modifications in the sample of
countries considered. Indeed, by restricting the sample to ‘similar’ coun-
tries, we obtain a more similar Kyoto estimate to the result obtained for the
matched sample, but still biased and much larger (0.11 vs. 0.07).
5. Conclusions
This paper tests for an effect of the Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions.
Our estimates indicate that countries with emission commitments from
the Kyoto Protocol emit on average about 7 per cent less CO2 than sim-
ilar countries that did not ratify the Protocol. We conclude that there is
a potential effect from the Kyoto policy on emissions in those countries.
The channel of this effect could be the difference in emission intensi-
ties between countries with Kyoto commitments and those without. Once
a country ratifies the Protocol with emission reduction obligations, it is
more likely to pass green growth policies, which do not immediately cut
emissions but reduce the emission intensity of GDP. We contribute to the
existing literature by using a new identification strategy of the causal effect,
namely using matching and difference-in-differences techniques to obtain
an accurate estimation of the Kyoto effect.
One matter of concern is whether we can indeed attribute the whole
estimated effect to the Kyoto Protocol, as the number of countries that
ratified the Protocol and face emission commitments (32) is rather small
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compared to the number of countries that do not face any emission com-
mitments under the Kyoto Protocol (138). It could be argued that Annex B
countries could have put the same effort into reducing their CO2 emissions,
even in the absence of the Protocol. Certainly, it is often claimed that regu-
latory stringency is a positive function of per capita income and in the last
decade many developed countries have been taking action to reduce emis-
sions, irrespective of the modest commitments required by the Protocol. In
this light, we leave the inclusion of better proxies for regulatory stringency
in the model for further research, which will help to support our findings.
In order to stabilize global warming at 2◦C, much more serious measures
will have to be taken. Although emissions from the developed coun-
tries with reduction commitments have declined and some countries like
France, the UK and Germany have achieved their targets, the decline in
emissions is unlikely to be enough to stabilize levels of GHG in the atmo-
sphere. Emissions from emerging countries, namely China and India, are
expected to increase substantially in the near future. Even if the involved
developed countries achieve their Kyoto target, it can only be considered
a partially successful agreement that is not going to be sufficient to solve
the global warming problem. Possible solutions could be to integrate more
countries into the treaty, including developing countries, or to establish an
international carbon tax on GHG emissions.
As the first commitment round of the Kyoto Protocol has closed in 2012
and as large emission reductions due to the Protocol were observed, it
would be desirable for the Doha Amendment, which sets the second com-
mitment round until 2020, to come into practice as soon as possible. Finally,
we would like to close the discussion by pointing out that according to our
findings even a treaty often seen as a ‘failure’ may in fact be producing
some non-negligible effects.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of Annex B countries with commitments in %
Country Commitment Ratified Country Commitment Ratified
Australia 8 2007 Liechtenstein −8 2004
Austria −13 2002 Lithuania −8 2003
Belgium −7.5 2002 Luxembourg −28 2002
Bulgaria −8 2002 Monaco −8 2006
Canada −6 withdrawn Netherlands −6 2002
Croatia −5 2007 New Zealand 0 2002
Czech Republic −8 2001 Norway 1 2002
Denmark −21 2002 Portugal 27 2002
Estonia −8 2002 Romania −8 2001
Finland 0 2002 Russia 0 2004
France 0 2002 Slovakia −8 2002
Germany −21 2002 Slovenia −8 2002
Greece 25 2002 South Korea −6 2002
Hungary −6 2002 Spain 15 2002
Iceland 10 2002 Sweden 4 2002
Ireland 13 2002 Switzerland −8 2003
Italy −6.5 2002 Ukraine 0 2004
Japan −6 2002 UK −12.5 2002
Latvia −8 2002 USA −7 not yet
Source: UNFCCC (2010). The EU’s internal allocation of the EU ‘bubble’ of 8%
reduction is shown for individual EU countries.
E
nvironm
entand
D
evelopm
entE
conom
ics
17
Table A2. Summary statistics
Variable Unit Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Kyoto Dummy for ratification 3,935 0.08 0.27 0 1
Treat Dummy for ratification (entire period) 3,935 0.17 0.38 0 1
CO2 Billion metric tons 3,487 0.13 0.55 0.00 7.69
Pop Thousand inhabitants 3,384 32,060.8 121,796.4 16.03 1,323,592
GDPH International dollars (ppp) 3,351 10,822.44 13,527.18 1.33 159,246.9
CO2 growth Percent 3,192 0.07 1.07 −0.96 58.38
GDP growth Percent 3,000 0.04 0.08 −0.49 1.3
Pop growth Percent 3,171 0.02 0.01 −0.08 0.14
CDM Number of projects 3,931 1.55 18.25 0 455
ICC Dummy for membership 3,935 0.25 0.43 0 1
WTO Dummy for membership 3,935 0.57 0.5 0 1
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Table A3. Cross correlations
Variable lnCO2 Kyoto Treat lnPop lnGDPH CO2 growth Pop growth GDP growth CDM ICC WTO
ln CO2 1
Kyoto 0.25∗∗∗ 1
Treat 0.41∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 1
lnPop 0.75∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 1
lnGDPH 0.41∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 1
CO2 growth −0.02 −0.02 −0.03∗ −0.02 −0.02 1
Pop growth −0.15∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.2∗∗∗ 0.03 1
GDP growth −0.01 −0.06∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.00 0.04∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 1
CDM 0.11∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.04∗∗ −0.04∗ 1
ICC 0.04∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.01 0.13∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.00 0.15∗∗∗ 1
WTO 0.17∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.03 −0.02 0.07∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 1
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
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Table A4. Bias reduction after the matching 2009
Mean t-test
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % reduction in bias t p > t
CO2 growth Unmatched −0.08 0.01 −88.70 −3.88 0.00
Matched −0.03 −0.04 7.70 91.30 0.36 0.72
Pop growth Unmatched 0.00 0.02 −119.30 −5.11 0.00
Matched 0.00 0.01 −7.50 93.70 −0.37 0.72
GDP growth Unmatched −0.06 0.02 −149.90 −7.23 0.00
Matched −0.03 −0.03 −10.20 93.20 −0.41 0.69
CO2 growth2 Unmatched 0.01 0.02 −19.80 −0.82 0.41
Matched 0.00 0.00 0.10 99.60 0.01 0.99
Pop growth2 Unmatched 0.00 0.00 −31.50 −1.29 0.20
Matched 0.00 0.00 −0.30 98.90 −0.21 0.84
GDP growth2 Unmatched 0.01 0.00 21.40 1.08 0.28
Matched 0.00 0.00 5.00 76.70 0.40 0.70
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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